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Abstract:
This paper focuses on the price stability objective within the framework of the single monetary policy
strategy. It starts by reviewing what this objective, which is common to all central banks, means.
Secondly, this paper will focus exclusively on the anchoring of short- to medium-term inflation
expectations (Part 2). Several measures show that this anchoring is effective. Modern New Keynesian
theory is an appropriate framework for analysing the impact that this anchoring of expectations has
on the determination of the short- to medium-term inflation rate. From this point of view, observed
inflation in the euro area seems to be in line with the theory and the ECB’s action seems to be very
effective. Thirdly, we will focus on the other aspect of monetary stability: the degree of price-level
uncertainty and the anchoring of inflation expectations in the medium to long term. Even though this
assessment is more difficult than it is in the short to medium term, since we only have a track record
covering five years, various indicators from the theoretical analysis paint a fairly reassuring picture
of the effectiveness of the device used by the ECB.
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Non technical summary
I
- Price stability needs to be examined using two criteria: a) the stability of short- to medium-term
inflation expectations; b) the absence of long-term price-level uncertainty. In practice,
unfortunately, assessments of monetary strategies are all too frequently limited to the first criteria.
- An inflation-targeting strategy is incomplete. It may ensure stability of the short- to medium-term
inflation rate, but it cannot guarantee monetary stability in the long term. Therefore, another
device is needed to supplement it.
- Central banks that have adopted an inflation-targeting strategy have not specified the exact nature
of the other device, even though some of them have mentioned it. On the other hand, in the case of
the ECB’s strategy, which could be qualified as a “mixed” or “hybrid” strategy, the reference
value for money growth should make it possible to regulate the price level in the long term.
II
- Since the single monetary policy was first applied, the short-term inflation dynamics has been
disrupted by a series of temporary price shocks, but these shocks have not affected the anchor for
inflation expectations, which have remained remarkably stable in a range between 1.5% and 2%.
- The “New Keynesian” analytical framework is appropriate for the short to medium term: a policy
to anchor inflation expectations is an effective instrument for ensuring monetary stability.
Furthermore, money can provide helpful information about future economic activity and, to a
lesser extent, about price developments.
- Short- to medium-term inflation in the euro area has been in keeping with the main tenets of
economic theory. A rough empirical review shows that: 1) There seems to be strong persistence of
inflation, which nevertheless seems to have abated substantially since the implementation of the
single monetary policy. 2) The change in the monetary regime did not give rise to greater
uncertainty about the short-term inflation dynamics, except for a fleeting moment during the cash
changeover to the euro. 3) The ECB’s monetary policy decisions seem to show that it has been
less aggressive than New Keynesian theory would recommend (Taylor principle). However, the
ECB’s response could be explained by the special attention paid to long-term inflation
expectations.
III
- The highlights of an empirical analysis of the medium- to long-term inflation dynamics in the euro
area are as follows: 1) The average annual steady-state inflation rate would be about 1.9%, which
is “close to, but less than 2%”. The reversion to the steady state after a transient inflation shock is
still quite slow. Reversion takes about seven years, because of the strong inertia of inflation. 2)
The various measurements of long-term inflation expectations are consistent and stable in a range
between 1.5% and 2%. The stability of these long-term expectations meant that the ECB did not
have to act very aggressively.
- New Keynesian analysis on its own cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the anchoring of
long-term inflation expectations. Money plays a decisive role in the long term. From this point of
view, the ECB’s announcement of a reference value for money growth is grounded on a sound
theoretical basis.
- Yet it is difficult to assess the medium- to long-term effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy
strategy after only four years of operation. However, a preliminary empirical analysis reveals
some fairly reassuring signs. 1) A shock that affects short-term inflation expectations usually does4
not have a knock-on effect on longer-term inflation expectations. 2) Since 1999, analysis has not
rejected the hypothesis of price stationarity around a deterministic trend, which is a sign of long-
term stability in the inflation rate and an absence of price-level uncertainty.
IV
- In terms of monetary policy strategy, the clarification provided at the end of the ECB Governing
Council meeting on 8 May 2003 was useful in three respects in light of the conclusions of this
report.
- The distinction drawn between “economic analysis”, which refers to the New Keynesian analytical
framework, and “monetary analysis” is a relevant one, because it makes it possible to anchor
short-, medium- and long-term inflation expectations simultaneously.
- It solves a problem in communicating and even implementing the single monetary policy strategy.
This strategy was based on a presentation of the two “pillars” as alternative explanations for
inflation, which could end up giving money a role in stabilising short-term anticipations that it
would be unable to play. In fact, the two approaches are complements to each other rather than
alternatives. Money plays a decisive role in anchoring long-term inflationary expectations, while
the New Keynesian framework is adequate for analysing short-term expectations. This means that
the change in the structure of the ECB President’s introductory statement following each
Governing Council meeting will fully reflect the complementary nature of the two analytical
frameworks.
- Finally, the anchoring of inflation expectations stemming from the announcement of the reference
value and from the European Central Bank’s credibility ensures that there is no long-term price-
level uncertainty. This means that monetary policy does not necessarily have to compensate for a
deviation from the inflation path in the short term, since the reversion to the equilibrium path
should be achieved via expectations.5
Introduction
This paper focuses on the price stability objective within the framework of the single monetary policy
strategy. It starts by reviewing what this objective, which is common to all central banks, means (Part
1). It encompasses two very distinct characteristics (Ireland, 1993): a) the anchoring of short- to
medium-term inflation expectations; b) the absence of long-term price-level uncertainty. The ECB’s
monetary strategy is aimed at achieving both objectives simultaneously in the euro-area economy.
Secondly, this report will focus exclusively on the anchoring of short- to medium-term inflation
expectations (Part 2). Several measures show that this anchoring is effective. Modern New Keynesian
theory is an appropriate framework for analysing the impact that this anchoring of expectations has on
the determination of the short- to medium-term inflation rate. From this point of view, observed
inflation in the euro area seems to be in line with the theory and the ECB’s action seems to be very
effective. The third part of this report will focus on the other aspect of monetary stability: the degree of
price-level uncertainty and the anchoring of inflation expectations in the medium to long term (Part 3).
The approach used in Part 2 of the report is used again in Part 3. We start with an empirical analysis
aimed at revealing the steady-state inflation rate. This analysis reviews the various measures of
expected long-term inflation in the euro area. The theoretical framework used in Part 2 is then
supplemented byhighlighting the role played by the announcement of a reference value for the growth
of the money supply, which is intended to anchor long-term inflation expectations. This framework is
then used to assess the effectiveness of the ECB’s action to ensure monetary stability in the long term.
Even though this assessment is more difficult than it is in the short to medium term, since we only
have a track record covering five years, various indicators from the theoretical analysis paint a fairly
reassuring picture of the effectiveness of the device used.
As we can see, the analysis of monetary stability in the euro area hinges on the distinction between
short- to medium-term developments on one side and the long-term prospects on the other. For the
analysis to be complete, we need to look at each of these two aspects in turn, even though most of the
available research all too frequently focuses exclusively on the first. What does this distinction mean
in practice? The ECB mentions it explicitly when announcing its determination to control medium-
term inflation in the euro area. Some observers have expressed regret that the ECB does not provide an
operational definition of the medium term, but, at the same time, they state that it is by no means
certain that such a definition could be provided (Gali, 2003). This point of view is probably excessive.
A clear definition emerges from the research on the subject. Based on empirical studies of the
relationships between money, economic activity and prices, we can agree on the following definitions
(Issing et al, 2000; Jaeger, 2002): The short term is a period from one and a half to two years, during
which money mainly influences economic activity. The medium term corresponds to a complete
business cycle, lasting around five years. The long term is a period of eight to ten years, at least,
during which the neutrality of money manifests itself, since variations in the money supply affect only
the price level.
1. Monetary stability and the ECB’s strategy
1.1. What is monetary stability?
Strictly speaking, price stability is defined by two conditions: a) an absence of long-term price-level
uncertainty; and b) an expected inflation rate of zero (Ireland 1993). The definition used in practice is
often less strict. The second condition is not that stringent. Problems involved in measuring price
increases accurately mean that a slightly positive expected inflation rate is deemed to satisfy this
condition, as long as it is more or less constant. Some observers go even further and settle for
fulfilment of the second condition and ignore the first condition. Price stability is therefore defined as
a situation where “expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough
that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions” (Greenspan, 1989).6
The pure and amended forms of the second condition are justified by the institutional approach that
stresses the vulnerability of central banks in democratic societies. This approach was initially proposed
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and later developed by Barro and Gordon (1983). It is now expressed
in the form of the expectations trap hypothesis to explain inflation dynamics (Christiano and Gust
2000; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). If economic agents expect a high inflation rate, they take
protective actions and the monetary authorities are faced with the following dilemma (Chart 1).
- They can validate the expectations by increasing money growth, which allows them to
avoid a recession, but at the cost of higher inflation.
- They can abstain from increasing money growth, thus avoiding higher inflation, but
inducing recession.
If the central bank is to avoid this trap and ensure monetary stability, it must make it clear that the first
scenario must be ruled out. This is much easier to do if the central bank is independent from the
government. But regardless of the central bank’s status, everything depends on its strategy. Prompt
and decisive action in response to a substantial change in price-level expectations, meaning both
inflation and deflation expectations, prevents the triggering of chain reactions that can quickly spin out
of control. This calls for constant monitoring of the available indicators. The effectiveness of the
authorities’ action can be assessed by examining developments in the expected inflation rate, as
measured by surveys or indicators constructed from financial market data. As the observed inflation
rate is equal to the expected inflation rate in the medium to long term, the first condition is deemed to
hold when the (log) price level is stationary around a trend line.
Chart 1
Monetary policy strategy and anchoring expectations
Source: Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) p. 24.
The first condition indicates that long-term price-level developments should be as steady as possible.3
There are many advantages to long-term price stability. It eliminates arbitrary wealth transfers, it
reduces calculation and menu costs, it enhances the role that prices play in the allocation of resources
and it eliminates the distortions of a tax system that applies to nominal values (see, for example,
Barnett and Engineer, 1999).“With long-term inflation expectations more firmly anchored, long-term
interest rates might jump around a bit less, and businesses and investors might find it easier to draw up
long-term contracts” (Rogoff, 2003). Any uncertainty in this area makes decision-making more
3 At this point, the definition of the long term is still fairly vague. It ranges from at least ten years to an average of twenty years. This
definition is set out in 2.1.7
difficult. Money does not fulfil its role of unit of account as well as it should and this penalises
economic agents, including households saving for retirement and businesses that have to borrow short-
term funds, since risk premiums make long-term financing more expensive. Consequently, deviations
from the trend line, corresponding to the anchoring of expectations on a given value, must not be too
large, otherwise uncertainty in the economic climate will increase and hamper investment and growth.
As we have already mentioned, this characteristic of monetary stability is often overlooked. At first
glance, this may seem only right; if inflation expectations are always anchored and, if there are no
shocks to the economy, then there is no price-level uncertainty. Naturally, the real world is different.
Central banks cannot control prices so strictly, nor do they want to, because, if they did and a shock
occurred, they would have to accept major fluctuations in economic activity. This means that inflation
may be higher or lower than expected over periods of varying lengths. If we consider that such
deviations become permanent, meaning that the central bank does not attempt to correct past
deviations, then long-term price-level developments become uncertain, despite the stability of inflation
expectations. Consequently, we need to assess the success of a monetary stability strategy using the
two criteria described at the outset.
1.2. Monetary stability programmes: the options available
The usual form of inflation target can be used to anchor expectations, but it does not ensure monetary
stability in the full meaning of the term. This requires a supplementary device aimed at reducing long-
term price-level uncertainty. On the other hand, a “Friedman” monetary rule would limit such
uncertainty, but it could not ensure sufficiently solid anchoring of short-term expectations. In theory,
the simplest solution to this problem is to set a price-level target. But this would entail other problems,
which we shall discuss later. In practice, the solution is to adopt a mixed, or hybrid, strategy, where
anchoring of expectations is backed up by a device that acts to force the price level back toward a
regular trend (McCallum, 1997; Batini and Yates, 2001; Mishkin, 2000). Periodic review of the
inflation target, or else the use of a reference value for money growth, can be considered as means
towards this end.4
1.2.1. Incomplete strategies: inflation targets or money growth rules
Many central banks have opted for an inflation target. They adjust the interest rate according to
expected developments in inflation at a time horizon that is generally between eighteen months and
two years ahead. This strategy is an effective way of anchoring inflation expectations over the period
concerned. But it may also entail a great deal of long-term price-level uncertainty (see Goodfriend,
1987). Inflation may in fact be higher or lower than expected. If we consider that deviations from the
constant path are permanent, as is usually the case, the trend in the price level may be irregular in the
long term, even though there is solid anchoring of inflation expectations in the shorter term.
Everything depends on whether this volatility creates troublesome uncertainty that could disrupt the
functioning of the economy. Some observers think that this is not the case. They use the following
arguments (McCallum, 1997, pp. 18-19): a) few economic decisions are based on planning horizons
over twenty years ahead; b) price-level uncertainty twenty years in the future is not large, even if the
log price level behaves as a random walk. A confidence interval at the usual level of 95% would be
only (plus or minus) 8% for the log price level at this horizon. This corresponds to a very low level of
uncertainty compared to that observed in the nineteen-sixties through the nineteen-eighties. But, even
if we accept this argument, which not all analysts do, the hybrid strategy is still better, because it
provides the advantages of stationarity of the price level around a trend (McCallum, 1997, p. 19).
Friedman (1960) proposed a constant-rate money supply growth rule. This rule should make a regular
long-term trend in the price level possible if the relationship between money supply and prices is
4 The list of hybrid strategies is longer. Mishkin (2000) suggests two others: 1) announcing an inflation target with a commitment to some
error correction in which target misses will be offset to some extent in the future; 2) pursuing an inflation target under normal conditions,
but providing for an escape clause that puts in place a price-level target in the event that deflation threatens, particularly if interest rates are
near 0%.8
stable over the period. To achieve this, the velocity of circulation and the economic growth rate must
not be affected by permanent shocks. Even if we assume that this is the case, the relationship between
money and prices cannot hold over a shorter period. This means that this strategy may have difficulty
providing a solid anchor for expectations at all times. It is also in contradiction to the real-world
situation, where central banks’ actions are taken in a short-term perspective and are aimed at
controlling interest rates rather than the growth of a monetary aggregate.
1.2.2. Price-level targeting
A central bank may choose to announce a growth path for the price level, which is the same as setting
a target for the average long-term inflation rate. The bank then attempts to correct deviations of the
observed growth path from the preset growth path. The success of this strategy can be measured by the
stationarity of the log price-level series around a linear trend. In this case, both characteristics of
monetary stability can hold at the same time. One of the main advantages of this strategy would be to
shelter the economy from the threat of deflation by curbing any price drift. If prices do fall, inflation
expectations will automatically be revised upwards (Svensson, 1999). On the other hand, output and
inflation would be more volatile than they would under an inflation-targeting regime. The reason for
this is simple: when a shock pushes inflation up over its average trend, the inflation rate has to fall
below the average later on. If the economy has nominal rigidities, the greater variability of the
inflation rate would give rise to greater variability in output. However, this idea has been called into
question by recent research showing that, under certain conditions relating to the formation of
expectations and the persistence of output, this strategy can ensure greater long-term price stability
without increasing the volatility of output (see Barnett and Engineer, 1999).
1.2.3. Combination of an inflation target and a price level target
King (1996) proposes a mixed strategy, with an inflation target for one and a half to two years ahead,
along with periodic assessments every five years of the price level and a calculation of the average
inflation rate for the period under review. In practice, this is the same as adopting an interest-rate rule
to correct deviations of the observed inflation rate from the target for short- to medium-term inflation,
as well as correcting the deviations of the observed variations from the desired price level. The price-
level correction occurs at a more distant horizon of ten or more years ahead. In this case, interest rates
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where: l3=l2/H and H denote the time horizon; yt-y* is the output gap; pt - p* is the deviation of
observed inflation from the inflation target; Pt – P* is the deviation of the observed price level from
the desired price level.5
1.2.4. Anchoring inflation expectations and the reference value for money growth.
Hetzel (1987, 1993) proposes some amendments to the strategy advocated by Friedman. Hetzel’s
proposal, like Friedman’s, is based on the quantitytheory of money and the principle of his proposal is
derived from the same theory. But Hetzel amends and completes the theory on the basis of the
observation that, in modern economies, the central bank does not have direct control over the quantity
of money. Instead it controls the interest rate. According to the quantity theory of money, the central
bank has to keep the interest rate at its equilibrium value in order to ensure price-level stability. This
means that the central bank: a) adjusts its interest rate according to variations in the real interest rates;
b) sets the interest rate so that the private sector can predict the future price level. In practice, the
monetary authorities adjust the interest rate according to the deviation of the price-level path expected
5 Batini and Yates (2001).9
by the private sector from the desired path, as measured, for example, via information provided by the
index-linked bond market. At the same time, the authorities monitor money supply growth. The main
difference with the previous strategy is that, if variations in money supply growth precede price-level
changes, then the variable should be forced back toward the preset long-term path sooner. The ECB
has chosen this type of strategy.
1.3. The ECB’s strategy
1.3.1. Hybrid strategy to ensure monetary stability
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB is price-stability oriented. The ultimate objective is defined
in the Maastricht Treaty, where Article 105 (1) stipulates, “The primary objective of the ESCB shall
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall
support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2.6 The ESCB shall act in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient
allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.”7
After its meeting of 13 October 1998,8 the Governing Council of the ECB described the main elements
of its monetary policy strategy. From the outset, this strategy has hinged on: a) a quantitative
definition of the price stability objective assigned to the ECB by the Maastricht Treaty, “a year-on-
year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%”; b)
an analysis that assigns a “prominent role for money” signalled by the announcement of a reference
value,9 and based on “a broadly-based assessment of the outlook for price developments […] using a
wide range of economic and financial variables”. The editorial in the first issue of the ECB Monthly
Bulletin in January 1999 made this “two pillar” approach official.
Furthermore, the Governing Council’s definition stipulates that: a) price stability needs to be
maintained in the medium term, thus acknowledging that there is short-term price volatility that cannot
be controlled by monetary policy; b) the emphasis is placed on the HICP “for the euro area”, since
monetary decisions are made according to developments relating to the euro area as a whole and not to
specific regions or countries; c) the 2% threshold is the same as that previously targeted by most of the
central banks in the euro area. With respect to the last point and in response to criticisms of the
asymmetrical character of the definition, the ECB later explained that the expression “year-on-year
increase in prices” automatically ruled out situations where prices fall (i.e. deflation).
Even though it really has not been called into question, except for some critics who would like to
replace it with core inflation, the appropriateness of the choice of the HICP as the reference indicator
for the quantitative definition of price stability was upheld during the internal evaluation exercise
carried out in the Eurosystem (Camba-Mendez, 2003). The HICP has many advantages, such as its
availability. It is one of the only harmonised indices calculated for the euro area as a whole. This
automatically ensures comparability of prices across the European Monetary Union. The HICP also
enjoys full credibility as a recognised and accepted measurement of price-level changes and it is
available on a monthly basis. However, the HICP also has some shortcomings. It could be improved
through more frequent revisions of the weights used at national level. In fact, only five out of the
6 Article 2 stipulates that “The Community shall have as its task […] to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, […] sustainable and non-inflationary
growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the
quality of the environment”.
7 In particular, Article 4 stipulates that the activities of the Member States and the Community shall include “the definition and conduct of a
single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without
prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition.”
8 See the Press Release dated 13 October 1998: “A stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB”.
9 See the Press Release dated 1 December 1998: “The quantitative reference value for monetary growth”.10
twelve countries revise their weights on an annual basis. Furthermore, it is impossible to measure the
margin of error in the measurement of prices in the euro area accurately.
In their reports to the French Council of Economic Analysis, Artus and Wyplosz (2002) state that the
ECB’s inflation target of 2% is too low and that the implicit target range is too narrow. They
recommend adopting range of 1% to 4% instead. Paul De Grauwe (quoted in an article in Le Monde,
29 January 2003, “La banque centrale européenne s’interroge sur son rôle”) suggests a smaller range
of 2% to 3%. In a series of papers, Svensson (2002; 2003) maintains that the Eurosystem’s definition
of price stability is ambiguous and asymmetrical and that it is less effective for anchoring expectations
than a point target would be. He argues that an explicit and symmetrical point inflation target of 1.5%,
2% or 2.5% would be better and would provide a better anchor for inflation expectations. He also
argues that, as long as a target value is announced clearly, it does not matter whether there is a range
or not (Svensson, 2002).
But the most important thing is that the ECB’s strategy focuses on both aspects of monetary stability.
This means that it can be regarded as a hybrid strategy aimed at anchoring medium-term inflation
expectations, while simultaneously seeking to reduce long-term price-level uncertainty. As
Jaeger (2002) so rightly stated, it can be seen as “a modified version of an inflation target, where the
central bank avoids announcing a precise value or range for the medium-term inflation rate, while
using an explicit nominal anchor (the reference value for M3 growth) to shape long-term inflation
expectations”.
1.3.1. Real determinants of inflation and anchoring short- to medium-term expectations
In the short to medium term, the ECB’s monetary strategy stresses the role of the real determinants of
inflation. This strategy is based on the widely accepted idea that monetary policy influences inflation
in the following manner: changes in key interest rates influence short-term interest rates, short-term
expectations with regard to economic activity and, through them, price-level changes. If follows that
“a broadly based assessment of the outlook for prices and the risks to price stability in the euro area
will play a major role in the Eurosystem’s strategy” (ECB, 1999a, p. 49). The appropriateness of
monetary policy shall be assessed by considering inflation forecasts derived from wages, exchange
rates, bond prices and the yield curve, various measures of real activity, price and cost indices and
surveys of businesses and consumers.
1.3.3. Monetary determinants of inflation and anchoring medium- to long-term expectations
The ECB’s monetary strategy is also intended to anchor medium- to long-term expectations. “The
statement that ‘price stability is to be maintained over the medium term’ reflects the need for monetary
policy to have a forward-looking, medium-term orientation” (ECB, 1999a, p. 47, the emphasis is
ours). The choice of method is based on the idea that monetary policy transmission mechanisms via
the real sector are not the only channels through which the central bank influences prices. “There is
broad consensus, based on substantial empirical evidence, that the development of the price level is a
monetary phenomenon in the medium to long term” (ECB, 1999b, p. 29, the emphasis is ours). Over
this period, “money constitutes a natural, firm and reliable ‘nominal anchor’ for monetary policy
aiming at the maintenance of price stability” (ECB, 1999a, p. 47, the emphasis is ours). This means
that money is given an important role through the announcement of a reference value for the growth of
a monetary aggregate. “However, the concept of a reference value does not entail a commitment on
the part of the Eurosystem to correct deviations of money growth from the reference value over the
short term” (ibid. p. 48).
The ECB’s ability to anchor long-term inflation expectations has been the subject of much
controversy. The critics are particularly severe with the core of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
They generally advocate an alternative inflation-targeting strategy in its place. In a review of the
practices and results of fifteen OECD countries’ central banks, Castelnuovo et al. (2003) show that
most of these central banks, with the notable exception of Japan, have managed increasingly to anchor11
agents’ long-term inflation expectations.10 This finding does not seem to depend on the strategic
framework or on the way the inflation target is specified (i.e. as a point target or a range). To a certain
extent, this research confirms the conclusions of Ball and Sheridan (2003), who cast doubt on the
superiority of inflation-targeting strategies when it comes to stabilising prices, output and interest
rates.
But, at what level should these inflation expectations be stabilised? The literature on finding the
optimal inflation rate has basically split into two camps, between those that think that inflation acts
like sand in the gears, slowing the economy down, and those who believe that it acts like grease.
Generally speaking, empirical research shows that there is a negative relationship between growth and
inflation, but that this relationship holds at relatively high levels of inflation. On the other hand, a
recent paper by Rodriguez-Palenzuela et al (2003) shows that, in the case of the euro area, moderate
levels of inflation would also produce “sand effects”. Yet, the euro area seems to be characterised by
major nominal rigidities, which hints that even a low rate of inflation could promote flexibility in real
wages and thus contribute to adjustment in the labour and goods markets, and ultimately boost growth.
However, Coenen (2003b) uses a small macroeconomic structural model calibrated to fit the euro area
to show that the impact of these nominal rigidities is small and that it is probably not significant for
inflation rates over 1%.
However, the choice of an excessively low inflation target entails the risk of being confronted with the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in the event of a major exogenous shock to the economy.
Low inflation and its corollary, low nominal interest rates, limit the potential of the central banks’
main instrument. The banks cannot lower their official rates far enough, which means that real rates
cannot fall enough to offset the effects of an unfavourable shock on the economy. Furthermore, when
nominal interest rates are near zero, a deflationary shock could lead to a rise in real interest rates,
which would be harmful for the economy. Simulations conducted using models calibrated to fit the
euro area tend to show that the likelihood of running up against the zero constraint on nominal interest
rates becomes negligible with an inflation target of 1% or more (Klaeffling and Perez, 2003).
However, these results depend heavily on assumptions about the wage-setting procedures. More
specifically, when wages are set in accordance with Taylor’s model11 (1979), the probability of
running up against the zero constraint is less than 7%, if the inflation target is between 1% and 2%. On
the other hand, the probability is no longer negligible when wage contracts are fixed in accordance
with the model proposed by Fuhrer and Moore12 (1995). When the inflation target is zero, the
probability is about 30%. It stands at 25% for a target of 1% and 17% for a target of 2% (Coenen,
2003a). Under the specifications for the second model, the existence of inflation rigidities, in addition
to price rigidities, means that a fall in inflation entails a drop in activity, whereas, in the first model,
lower inflation has no effect on output.
On 8 May 2003, the ECB presented the conclusions of an evaluation of its strategy. The evaluation
was motivated by a determination to review its performance after four years of operation. The
evaluation was intended as a response to the questions and comments of outside observers and it takes
into account the findings of research by ECB staff. With regard to the price stability objective, which
is the only one that interests us here, the Governing Council discussed the matter and decided to
uphold the 2% upper bound for the inflation rate, as measured by the HICP. It also stated its “aim to
maintain inflation rates close to, but below, 2% in the medium term”. It considered the costs of
inflation and the need to maintain a sufficient safety margin to guard against the risks of deflation. It
also addressed the issue of the possible measurement bias in the HICP and the implications of inflation
differentials within the euro area.
10 The long-term inflation expectations (10 years) are taken from the Consensus Forecast.
11 In this model, wages are set over the two periods and prices are determined by a constant mark-up on wages. This model induces price
rigidity but not inflation rigidity.
12 Unlike the previous model, this one assumes that there is also inflation rigidity.12
2. Anchoring short- to medium-term expectations and inflation dynamics
What influence has the ECB’s monetary policy had on the euro area inflation rate in the short to
medium term? We cannot answer this question without reference to an analytical framework. We shall
present this framework after reviewing historical and expected inflation developments since 1999. The
framework is then used to interpret these developments, with an effort to reveal the ECB’s
contribution to price stability and its influence on inflation dynamics.
2.1. Short-term inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area
2.1.1. Inflation level: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices is the general price level measure that the ECB uses to
measure inflation in the euro area. This choice is explained by: a) the extensive harmonisation of the
index across the countries in the euro area; b) its availability and c) the important role it plays in
economic agents’ decision-making. But this index may be volatile at times when some of its
components, such as food or oil prices, are affected by temporary shocks that do not influence the rate
of inflation in the medium to long term, which is the type of inflation that concerns the monetary
authorities. Sometimes, a measure of the core or underlying inflation rate is used to get around this
problem. For example, the Bank of Canada uses a consumer price index that is adjusted for changes in
indirect taxes (Core CPI). There is a core inflation index for the euro area that excludes prices for
energy and fresh food.
Chart 2 shows the monthly variations in the year-on-year inflation rate from 1993Q1 to 2003Q3. There
are three easily discerned stages. Up until 1999, the convergence of national inflation rates on the
lowest rates led to a steady fall in average inflation. The single monetary policy was initiated in a very
favourable environment, coinciding with a fall in inflation. This was mainly due to declines in energy
prices, unit wage costs and commodity prices on world markets (see, for example, Hayo, Neumann
and von Hagen, 2002). Later on, the situation was reversed and supply conditions deteriorated as
productivity gains slowed, diseases affected livestock, and oil prices and relative service prices rose
(see Artus, 2002). Then, after 2001, inflation resumed its downward trend but there were episodes of
increased volatility.
The same chart shows year-on-year changes in core inflation too. The comparison with the HICP








93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
HICP Core inflation
Year-on-year change in prices in the euro area (% )13
2.1.2. Short-term inflation expectations
Inflation expectations can be measured at different levels: consumers or producers, through business
conditions surveys; economists or forecasters, through surveys and questionnaires aimed at
aggregating their views on current or future activity and price developments; directly on financial
markets by deriving inflation expectations from yields on index-linked bonds.
Consumers’ inflation expectations are a good leading indicator for future inflation, with a lag of about
one year (see Forsells and Kenny, 2002).
Opinion surveys show that households’ very-short-term inflation expectations seem to move in
parallel to observed inflation. However, since the beginning of 2002, there has been a gap between the
inflation as it is perceived by households and observed inflation. However, the divergence of trends
relating to perceived inflation and expected inflation testifies to solid anchoring of European
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Surveys of economists and forecasters are a second source of information. Since early 1999, the ECB
staff has conducted a quarterly survey of a panel of professional forecasters from the private sector.13
One special feature of this survey is that the forecasters are asked directly to assign a distribution of
probabilities to various future inflation rates in the euro area for the current year and up to four years
ahead. Charts 4 below shows the average inflation forecasts of the panel at different time horizons and
Chart 5 shows the changes in the individual mean probability distributions. Whether we consider the
mean expectations in Chart 4 or the distributions in Chart 5, we see that the forecasters’ inflation
expectations for the euro area seem to be particularly solidly anchored in the short to medium term, as
are those of households.
13 The results of the survey are available on the ECB’s web site: www.ecb.int14
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The above Chart shows that the forecasters predictions for the current year mirror the many supply
shocks that marked the first four years of the single monetary policy, but their inflation expectations
tend to fall within a range that narrows as the forecast horizon becomes more distant. At one year
ahead (i.e. four quarters from the present, the “q+4” series, expected inflation ranges between 1.2%
and 1.9% from the first quarter of 1999 to the last available survey in the second quarter of 2003. This
range narrows to 1.5% to 1.9% when we look at the two-years-ahead forecast (“q+8” series) and in the
four-years-ahead forecast (n+4 series), the predictions look remarkably stable and firmly anchored
between 1.8% and 1.9%.
Changes in the mean individual probability distributions (Chart 5) also show the same gradual trend
towards stabilisation of short- to medium-term inflation expectations since implementation of the
single monetary policy started.
The mean probability distribution of the forecasts for the short to medium term (up to 4 years ahead)
also appears to be remarkably stable. Since the beginning of the survey, the mode has always been
between 1.5% and 1.9%. The mean probability that the forecasters give for the inflation rate falling
within this range is practically constant at nearly 40%.
The same holds true for one-year-ahead inflation forecasts, where forecasters give a slightly higher
probability of the inflation rate falling within the 1.5%-to-1.9% range, which may suggest that they
expect the ECB to respond quite rapidlyto current price shocks.
The only distributions that fall outside the 1.5%-to-1.9% range are those relating to the current year,
because they take account of several shocks. For example, the surveys in the first quarter of 1999 and
the first quarter of 2001, as well as the one in the second quarter of 2003, show that the current price
dynamics do not materially affect the distribution of inflation expectations, either when they are weak,
as was the case in 1999, or when they are strong, as was the case in 2001 and 2003.15
Chart 5
ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters: mean probability distributions




















































































































































The low-inflation environment that the industrial countries’ economies experienced in the 1990s was
certainly a factor that helped to strengthen the solid anchoring of inflation expectations and it was not
specific to the euro area. Table 1 below was drawn up from the results of the Consensus Forecast. It
shows a substantial reduction in revisions of inflation expectations for the current year. The size of the
reduction in the euro area is comparable to that observed in other countries and does not seem to be
directly dependent on the strategic framework for monetary policy.16
Table 1:
Inflation expectations (percentage points)
Mean variation of inflation expectations Over current year (1)
United States
1990 – 2003 42
1999 – 2003 32
United Kingdom
1990 – 2003 53
1999 – 2003 22
Canada
1990 – 2003 64
1999 – 2003 40
Euro area
1999 – 2003 28
Source: Consensus Economics – Banque de France estimates. The proxy for expected inflation in
the euro area is the weighted mean of inflation expectations in Germany, France, Italy and
the Netherlands from 1999 to2002.
2.2. Short- and medium-term inflation determination and dynamics
What influence has the ECB’s monetary policy had on determining the equilibrium short-term price
level? How does this policy influence inflation dynamics? New Keynesian theory provides the
appropriate framework for answering these questions.
2.2.1. Analytical framework
Based on recent theoretical and applied research, we have chosen the following simplified model to
represent the structure of the euro-area’s economy and the monetary authorities’ behaviour.14
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where: x is the output gap; i is the nominal interest rate; Et is the conditional expectation calculated at
date t; p is the inflation rate; g denotes a goods demand-side shock; u denotes a supply-side shock; p is
the price level; m denotes the money supply; w denotes a money demand shock (all of the variables,
except for the interest rate, are expressed as logarithms).
Equations (1) and (2) represent the structure of the economy. Equation (1) is an IS curve, where
demand for goods and services depends negatively on the interest rate. Equation (2) is a Phillips curve,
where inflation depends positively upon the output gap. The euro area’s economy features persistence
14 The choice of the model for the economic structure is based on Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997). The
model for the ECB’s behaviour is based on Gali (2003).17
phenomena (see OECD, 2002, for example). Nominal rigidities hamper inflation adjustment during
periods of slower economic activity. The rigidities stem from various origins: resistance to nominal
wage reductions, owing to psychological factors (a form of the money illusion) and institutional
factors (processes for renegotiating contracts); menu costs and the strategic behaviour of firms on
markets with imperfect competition, leading them to wait until a competitor makes the first move
before adjusting their prices, etc. To account for this situation, the output gap value in the IS curve
equation is lagged and the inflation value in the Phillips curve equation is lagged. Equation (7)
represents equilibrium on the money market. In it, the demand for real balances depends on income
and on the nominal short-term interest rate. This specification assumes that money-market securities
are the only assets that can be substituted for money.
The adjustment lags in the economy mean that monetary policy affects inflation with a two-period lag.
A change in the interest rate affects the output gap after one period and it then takes another period for
the change in the output gap to affect prices. Equations (3) and (4) represent the central bank’s
behaviour. Equation (3) indicates the desired value of the nominal interest rate for the current period
(i*). The first term represents the ECB’s determination to anchor expectations at the value p*. More
specifically, the interest rate is raised or lowered according to the deviation from the target of the
inflation rate forecast two periods ahead, since transmission lags make it impossible to affect inflation
sooner. The output gap also influences i*, even if price stability is the central bank’s only objective.
This is true because the structural characteristics of the economy incorporated into equations (1) and
(2) mean that inflation in the current period is predetermined and responds to the output gap with a
one-period lag (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Gali, 2003). Furthermore, equation (4) introduces the
possibility of inertia in the monetary authorities’ behaviour, which leads to interest-rate smoothing.
Finally, the economy is affected by exogenous demand-side shocks (g) and exogenous supply-side
shocks (u). It is simplest to assume that there is no correlation between shocks from one period to the
next at this level. However, it would surely be more realistic to introduce persistence phenomena here
too, for example by assuming that:
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2.2.2. Inflation properties in relation to monetary policy
In a steady state with no shocks (g=u=0), the characteristics of the economy are as follows: the goods
market is in equilibrium (y=z) and the output gap is zero; the central bank’s inflation objective has
been achieved (p=p
*) and the increase in wages is equal to productivity gains. To achieve this, the
central bank’s interest rate policy needs to comply with the Taylor principle: its response to a change
in inflation expectations must be strong (gp>1) because it has to adjust the real interest rate ex ante to
stabilise the economy. A key property of the model is that the equilibrium value of the inflation rate is
independent of the money supply. The latter is endogenous and automatically adjusts to the
equilibrium values of national income and interest rates. As King (2002) noted, “if the model were an
accurate description of the economy, the interest rate would be a sufficient statistic of monetary
policy”. Monitoring money supply growth does not provide any further information.
In the short term, the inflation rate may deviate from the central bank’s target in the event of
temporary supply-side shocks, such as changes in productivity gains or energy and commodity prices,
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The persistence of inflation (as measured by ap) depends on shocks and the previously observed
structural characteristics of both the demand and supply sides. It also depends on the monetary
authorities’ behaviour. Reversion to the inflation target p* takes place more quickly if: a) the monetary
authorities’ reaction to changes in inflation expectations (as measured by gp) is strong and b) interest-
rate smoothing (as measured by r) is weak.
The variability of inflation is directly linked to the size of supply-side shocks, since monetary policy is











If this representation is correct, “once a situation is reached with a widespread expectation that
monetary policy is able and willing to generate a low inflation rate, all future-oriented nominal
contracts are based on a low inflation component so that future wage and price increases will in fact be
low. It is obvious that this mechanism has a self-stabilising tendency. If the public is convinced of
having a stability-oriented central bank, temporary deviations of the inflation rate are not regarded as a
sign of incompetence or a deliberate inflation policy. Thus, expectations remain unchanged, which
allows to regain the original low inflation rate” (Bofinger, 2000a).
In practice though, things are much more complicated and anchoring inflation expectations carries
some risks. These arise from the problems encountered in determining whether shocks are temporary
or permanent. For example, a demand-side shock in a situation where the central bank enjoys strong
credibility could give rise to tension on the labour market without triggering an increase in inflation.
Wage-earners will not ask for an increase in nominal wages because they are convinced that firms will
not raise their prices. Meanwhile, firms are encouraged not to change their prices, even if wage costs
increase, and we see a decline in the inflation rate accompanied by a decline in the pricing power of
firms (Taylor, 2000). Both firms and wage-earners think that the excess demand will be temporary and
that it will be eliminated by an increase in interest rates. But the anchoring of expectations may lead
the bank to delay raising its interest rates. Similarly, in the event of a favourable supply-side shock, in
a situation where the central bank enjoys good credibility and expectations are solidly anchored, both
the private sector and the central bank may underestimate the potential output level. Once again, there
is a risk that interest rates will not be raised far enough and the threat of an unsustainable boom in the
economy in general, and in asset markets in particular, that will be followed by a period of painful
adjustment. This is what happened in the United States between 1996 and 1999. The central bank
becomes a victim of its own credibility and the subsequent anchoring of expectations (Goodfriend,
2001, 2002). The danger is more acute because the indicators that the authorities use to guide their
action may become less reliable during such periods (Orphanides, 2001). The error lies in believing
that the economic agents’ behaviour (wage-earners’ pay demands and firms’ price-setting) is
independent from the inflation environment. This behaviour changes once the private sector no longer
believes that the central bank is determined to raise its rates to keep inflation low. For example, in the
event of a demand-side boom, firms’ profit margins may stay abnormally low, until firms lose
confidence in the central bank’s determination not to accommodate inflation (Taylor, 2000).
15 If we assume that the central bank has all of the information necessary to identify such shocks when they occur.19
2.3. Monetary policy and inflation in the euro area
The theoretical framework presented above is used to analyse short- to medium-term developments in
the inflation rate in the euro area by looking at its various characteristics (level, variability,
persistence) in turn. It is also used to analyse the contribution that monetary policy makes in this area.
2.3.1. Method used for empirical analysis
Theoretical analysis shows that the equilibrium inflation rate and its dynamic properties result from
interactions between shocks to the economy, the structural characteristics of the economy and the
monetary authorities’ behaviour. It would take an analysis using a full model of the euro-area
economy to isolate the different influences affecting prices and, more particularly, the influence of the
ECB’s action. The method used here is a more succinct one. The experience of the euro area is
examined on the basis of estimates from two equations: the equation that explains price dynamics, and
the one that reflects the central bank’s reaction function. This method, which Adolfson and
Söderstrom (2003) and Crawford (2001) use to analyse the impact of an inflation targeting regime on
short- to medium-term inflation dynamics in Sweden and Canada, is acceptable and leads to accurate
conclusions if we ensure that the error terms in the estimated equation have the right statistical
properties in every case, meaning no correlation and normality and stability of variance.
2.3.2. Inflation variability
Inflation variability is analysed using equation (10). The theoretical model “acknowledges the
existence of short-term volatility in prices, resulting from non-monetary shocks to the price level that
cannot be controlled by monetary policy “(ECB, 1999a, p. 47). Chart 6 shows the distribution of
variation rates for the HICP from 1993q1 to 2003q3. Chart 7 shows the distribution of variation rates
for core inflation. Both charts once again show the effect of temporary shocks, particularly when we
look at the relatively high frequency of price deviations at both extremities of the distributions.
Paradoxically, however, the total inflation variation rates are more strongly clustered around a mean
value close to 2.2% than the core inflation variation rates are. The latter appear to be more volatile
over the whole period. The holds true when the sample is restricted to the period from 1999 to 2003.
In this case the mean for the HICP is close to 2% with a standard deviation of about 0.56%, whereas
the mean for core inflation is 1.7% with a standard deviation of 0.64%.
Chart 6








1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5


































Hereafter, we shall focus on developments in the HICP, which is the measure that the ECB uses.
2.3.3. Inflation rate persistence and autocorrelation
Inflation rate autocorrelation depends on the monetary authorities’ behaviour (equation (10)) For
example, if the authorities keep the inflation rate to the median of a target range one and a half to two
years ahead, the shocks affecting the current value of the inflation rate will be inverted over this
period. There will be no correlation between current inflation and the inflation rate at the time horizon
in question. If this time horizon is more distant, for example two years ahead, the first autocorrelation
coefficient may be positive. In this case the confidence interval defined for the inflation rate will
diminish over time.
On the other hand, if the monetary authorities are not committed to a price stability objective, an
increase in current inflation tends to be persistent and there is a positive correlation between current
and future inflation. In this case, the confidence interval increases and there is more uncertainty about
future inflation.
One simple way to assess the autocorrelation of inflation rates is to estimate equation (9) using
monthly data. In order to consider monthly results, we look at the relationship between the current
inflation rate over twelve months and past inflation rates over twelve-month periods that do not
overlap (see Crawford, 2001, for example):
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The results are shown in Table 2. The estimated values of the parameters relating to lagged inflation
are significantly different from zero. More specifically, the first autocorrelation coefficient, measured
one year ahead, is positive, while the second, measured two years ahead, is negative. This pattern
corresponds to a situation where the ECB is trying to bring the inflation rate back in line with its target
within two years. This objective can be estimated by rewriting the equation as follows:
16HICP except for energy and unprocessed food.21
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where * p is the steady-state inflation rate, which can also be seen as the medium-term inflation
target.
Its estimated value,17 in view of the results shown in Table 2, is equal to 1.94%.18 This is in line with
the ECB’s announcement that it would maintain the inflation rate close to, but below, 2%.
Table 2
Dependent variable: p
Method: OLS. Estimation period: 1995:01 2003:03
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
p t-12 0.679282 0.098028 6.929496 0.0000
pt-24  -0.257614 0.080719 -3.191476 0.0019
C 0.011270 0.001627 6.926164 0.0000
R-squared 0.348351 Mean dependent var 0.019550
Adjusted R-squared 0.334775 S.D. dependent var 0.005681
S.E. of regression 0.004634 Akaike info criterion -7.881039
Sum squared resid 0.002061 Schwarz criterion -7.802399
Log likelihood 393.1114 F-statistic 25.65932
Durbin-Watson stat 0.359047 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Empirical studies on a number of countries show that persistence varies over time depending on the
nature of monetary policy.19 What does observation of the euro area show? Have the creation of the
ECB and the implementation of its price-stability-oriented monetary policy strategy had an impact on
the autocorrelation of inflation rates? A comparison between the period from 1993 to 1998 and the
period from 1999 to 2003 can provide some helpful information on the subject, even though there are
obvious limitations. It would be simplistic to attribute all changes to the new monetary regime, since
other factors, such as the change in exogenous shocks affecting inflation, could be involved too. Other
factors might include economic agents’ anticipation of the regime change long before it came into
effect. Chart 8, which plots the autocorrelation of inflation rates over each of the two periods, shows
two changes. Overall, persistence seems to have diminished. The autocorrelation coefficient is weaker
with each successive lag. The autocorrelation coefficient has become negative in the recent period for
lags of one and a half years up to two years. This confirms an earlier observation and its interpretation
as showing the ECB’s determination to bring the inflation rate back in line with its target within two
years.








18 In view of the margin of error on the constant alone, the 95% confidence interval is [1.4% to 2.5%].
19 For example, Longworth (2002) shows that the dynamic behaviour of Canadian inflation underwent fundamental changes after the
inflation target was adopted in 1991. One of the main changes was the decline in the autocorrelation of inflation rates.22
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In order to make sure that this result is meaningful, we compare the value of the coefficients for
successive lagged inflation rates over two sub periods (Chart 9) and the 95% confidence intervals
around the estimated values of these coefficients (Chart 10).
Chart 9
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These two charts show that it is very difficult to distinguish between the two sub-periods at the
statistical level. With a few rare exceptions, the value of the coefficient hardly changes from one
period to the next and the 95% confidence intervals are practically indistinguishable. Furthermore,
these coefficients are not statistically different from zero.
2.3.4. Short-term price-level uncertainty
Uncertainty about short-term inflation can first be measured by the conditional variance of forecasting
errors derived from a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedastisity model of inflation20
(Crawford and Kasumovich, 1996; Jenkins and O’Reilly, 2001; Longworth, 2002). Such a measure
constructed for the euro area on the basis of a GARCH(1.1) model estimated for the period from 1993
to 2003 produces the following results:
Chart 11
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20 In this type of model, the expected variance of inflation for the following period, which is also called conditional variance, is assumed to
depend on three terms: mean inflation, new information about volatility obtained during the previous period and measured as the square of
the forecasting error, and past variance forecasts.24
Uncertainty about inflation during the period under review seems to stabilise at low levels at the end
of the nineteen-nineties. It then increases rapidly, concomitantly with energy price shocks and
unprocessed food price shocks, and again with the changeover to the euro. At the very end of the
period, when uncertainty seems to ease and return to its earlier levels, the rise in oil prices brings with
it a fresh surge in uncertainty. The estimation of the GARCH model also shows how highly
entrenched the impact of shocks on inflation volatility is, as the autoregressive root corresponding to
the sum of the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH terms is close to unity (0.88).
We can use a second type of indicator, which is based on the dispersion of inflation forecasts
according to the time horizon for the forecast. Chart 12 below shows this indicator, which is derived
from the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters mentioned above. As we can see in Chart 12, the
dispersion naturally tends to increase as the time horizon grows more distant. The variance of forecasts
four years ahead (n+4), two years ahead (or eight quarters, denoted q+8) and one year ahead is
generally greater than the variance of forecasts relating to the current year is. However, there is a
steady diminishing trend in the dispersion of inflation forecasts four years ahead, which could be
interpreted as a sign of reduced uncertainty about the short- to medium-term inflation rate. This trend
corroborates the conclusions drawn on the basis of the preceding indicator to a certain extent.
Chart 12
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2.3.5. Information provided by money
Even though the New Keynesian analytical framework seems to attribute it a limited role, money can
still be useful for monetary decision-making because of its information content with regard to future
activity and inflation.
Tables 3 and 4 below show some empirical results obtained from an analysis based on the approach
originally proposed by Stock and Watson (2001), where the predictive powers of some fifty potential
leading indicators are assessed with regard to future activity and inflation in the euro area. The
indicators assessed include certain commodity prices, a vast assortment of asset prices and financial
variables, a measure of the output gap and, finally, monetary aggregates. The estimates are made for
the period from 1980 to 2002. The quality of a leading indicator is measured on the basis of its
predictive powers two, four and eight quarters ahead. The tables show the Relative Root Mean Square
Error (Relative RMSE) of the forecasts made without samples and obtained with the help of a purely
autoregressive model of activity growth and inflation and those obtained using a model that
incorporates current and past values of the leading indicator under consideration. A ratio of less than 1
shows that the indicator contains information about future activity or inflation, since taking it into25
account helps to improve forecasting of the variable in question. Of the fifty or so indicators tested,
only those possessing this property were selected. In addition, the tables show the time horizon at
which the best forecast of each indicator is obtained. For example, in Table 3 below, including the
three-month interest rate helps achieve a 10% improvement (Relative RMSE equals 0.90) in the
activity growth forecast obtained with a purely autoregressive model at a time horizon of four quarters.
The figures in parentheses are the results of the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1994), which
measures whether the forecast obtained using the potential leading indicator is statistically different
from the forecast derived from the purely autoregressive model21. A high probability value means that
it is difficult to distinguish between the two forecasts statistically. Only the leading indicators with the
strongest predictive powers are included in the table.
Starting with the results obtained from Table 3, we see that the monetary aggregate M2 expressed in
real terms has the best predictive powers of any of the potential leading indicators studied at a one-
year time horizon, with M1 (expressed in real terms as well) coming a close second.
The information content of these monetary aggregates with regard to activity growth largely exceeds
the information content of asset prices and other financial variables selected for this study.
Table 3
Best leading indicators for activity growth in the euro area
Leading indicator Relative RMSE (p-values) Horizon (quarters)
Three-month interest rate 0.90 (0.38) 4
Two-year yield on govt. securities 0.95 (0.60) 4
Spread (10 years – three months) 0.99 (0.99) 2
Commodity prices 0.99 (0.88) 2
Real market capitalisation 0.96 (0.29) 8
Real equityprices 0.99 (0.87) 8
Detrended three-month rate 0.92 (0.42) 8
Real gold price 0.98 (0.89) 2
Real M1 0.92 (0.54) 4
Real M2 0.86 (0.17) 4
Source: Clerc (2002)
These two monetary aggregates also have good predictive powers with regard to inflation, but to a
lesser extent. However, their information content seems to relate to longer time horizons, of eight
quarters in this case. Furthermore, they are dominated by asset prices or financial variables and oil
prices.
Table 4
Best leading indicators for inflation in the euro area
Leading indicator Relative RMSE (p-values) Horizon (quarters)
Two-year yield on govt. securities 0.89 (0.58) 8
Five-year yield on govt. securities 0.96 (0.58) 8
Gold price (nominal) 0.98 (0.74) 4
Real gold price 0.87 (0.46) 8
Real oil price 0.87 (0.17) 4
Real M1 0.90 (0.76) 8
Real M2 0.96 (0.89) 8
Source: Clerc (2002)
21 The autoregressive model for inflation performs reasonably well over the sample period. This result contrasts with Bruneau et al. (2003)
who found that a “Phillips curve” like model is a better performer after 1999. However, according to our own findings, the output gap, as
measured by the deviation of the log of real GDP from a one-sided HP filter, does not improve the inflation forecasts.26
The M3 monetary aggregate, which belongs to the set of our potential leading indicators, does not
seem to have particularly notable information content about either future activity growth or inflation
for time horizons of less than two years. However, the scale of portfolio shifts seen in the euro area,
particularly massive acquisitions of money market fund units in a context of stock market volatility,
has undoubtedly accounted for some weakening of this information content.
2.3.6. Compliance with the Taylor principle and the limitations of short- to medium-term analysis
The “Taylor principle” is the condition that is theoretically necessary to ensure economic stability.
Does it hold empirically for the euro area? The ECB’s interest rate policy has given rise to concern, or
questions in this regard. Gali (2003) compared the observed interest rate values from January 1999 to
April 2002 to the reference values calculated using a modified version of equation (3):
() t x t t x i g p p g p a p + - + + = * * ) (3'
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with gp=1.5, r*=2.5, p* =1.5 and assuming that there is no interest-rate smoothing (r=0). It appears
that, “with the exception of the very early part of the sample, the interest rate set by the ECB has
remained substantially below the level implied by the benchmark rule”. Artus (2002a) confirmed this
conclusion with an estimate made on virtually the same period (January 1999 to March 2002) using
equation (3’). This produced the following results:
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This shows that the interest rate was set too low with regard to inflation (gp<1). These results would
suggest that the ECB is unresponsive to inflation developments, since the short-term interest rate is too
low with regard to inflation. If this were so, there would be every reason to be concerned. For
example, Artus concludes that if this characteristic were true, the equilibrium inflation rate in the euro
area would be greater than 2.5%, which was its value at the time he conducted his study.22
Analysis of the ECB’s interest rate policy must not, in fact, be based on the actual inflation rate, as it is
in equation (3’), but on its expected value, as it is in equation (3). Gali (2003) shows that, in this case,
the observed values of the interest rate are closer to the reference values (Chart 13). But some episodes
are still hard to explain, according to Gali. There was no tightening of monetary policy after May
1999, even though a significant increase in the expected inflation rate was observed. The increase in
inflation expectations in early 1999 was an international phenomenon that did not elicit a rapid
response from the central banks concerned.23 Then, there was a series of interest rate hikes starting in
November 1999, even though there was no notable change in the expected inflation rate.
22 Nevertheless, these equations produce astonishing results. More specifically, according to equation (3’), the constant of the regression
corresponds to the expression a +( 1 - gp) p*, where a corresponds to the real interest rate. In view of the small estimated value of gp,t h e
large negative value of the constant implies a very negative real interest rate in the euro area!
23 This episode is discussed further in 3.1.27
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However, in Chart 12, the straight line of best fit through the cluster of points, meaning the straight
line of the regression between interest rates and expected inflation, would have a slope equal to 3,
suggesting that the ECB’s official interest rates react strongly to expected inflation one year ahead.
Contrary to what this suggests, non-compliance with the Taylor principle is also shown by another
estimation of equation (3’) for the period from January 1999 to April 2002. The estimation is another
one from Artus (2002) and is contained in his report to the Council for Economic Analysis:24
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This result may be explained by the extreme simplicity of the methods that the authors cited used to
estimate the value of gp and by econometric problems. For example, the paucity of observations
available since the ECB started conducting monetary policy makes estimation of its reaction function
an extremely delicate exercise25. But, at a more fundamental level, we should discuss the limitations of
the type of theoretical modelling used up until now. This is shown very clearly in some theoretical
research where some hypotheses are borne out and it is demonstrated that compliance with the Taylor
principle alone is not enough to ensure the uniqueness and equilibrium of rational expectations. First
of all the government’s budget constraint must not be overlooked. Compliance with the Taylor
principle in a situation where the fiscal authorities are non-Ricardian, meaning that they do not take
account of this constraint ex ante, may lead to an explosive rise in the price level. In the event of an
inflation shock, an increase in the real interest rate by the central bank would lead to an increase in the
24 This estimation, like the previous ones, implies a negative real interest rate for the euro area.
25 For instance, Gesdesmeier and Roffia (2003) estimated similar relations but mainly on the pre-EMU period (1985-2001), using the GMM.
They found that the Taylor principle was generally satisfied, using different specifications. However, the very high values of the
coefficient of their lagged interest rate, generally above 0.95, as well as those of the R² statistics, close to 0.99, might suggest the presence
of units roots and therefore should lead to a cautious interpretation of their results.28
interest expense on the public debt, which would trigger a further increase in inflation. The central
bank would respond with another rate increase and the cycle would continue (Asselain et al, 2002;
Leeper, 1991, Loyo, 1999). In such a situation, it is better for the value of gp to be less than unity. The
same holds true if we take account of the liquidity constraints that economic agents have to cope with
(Masuch et al. 2003). Theses results illustrate a more general conclusion: if monetary policy is to
ensure monetary stability, then it must not concern itself solely with anchoring short- to medium-term
expectations; it must also be concerned with medium- to long-term anchoring of expectations.
3. Anchoring inflation expectations and price-level stability in the medium
to long term
The ECB’s strategy now needs to be analysed in the medium to long term. This is defined as a period
ranging from the average length of a business cycle (a few years) up to the time horizon for economic
agents’ intertemporal decision-making (twenty to thirty years). Analysis is necessarily a delicate
matter at the empirical level, since there are only a few years of experience on which to base a
calculation of the steady-state inflation rate for the euro area. The theoretical model needs to be
supplemented to account explicitly for the role that the ECB attributes to money in anchoring long-
term inflation expectations. Interpreting developments observed within the framework defined should
make it possible to evaluate the contribution that monetary policy makes to long-term price stability in
the euro area.
3.1. Steady-state inflation and anchoring medium- to long-term expectations
We have seen that temporary shocks have dominated short-term inflation dynamics in the euro area
since 1999 without undermining the stability of short-term inflation expectations. What is the situation
with regard to the economy’s steady state? What is the value of the equilibrium inflation rate? Are
long-term inflation expectations as stable as the short-term expectations are?
3.1.1. Stability of the medium-term inflation rate
Price-level uncertainty tends to diminish more than one year ahead if monetary policy always attempts









p p where pi corresponds to the inflation rate for a given year.
When inflation rates are not correlated from one year to the next, the standard deviation of the mean
annual inflation rate calculated over n years is given by:
n
s s p = where s represents the standard deviation of the inflation rate over 12 months.
The standard deviation of mean inflation, therefore, is inversely proportional to the number of years n
considered when calculating the mean. Chart 14 shows the construction of a confidence interval for
the successive year-on-year changes in the HICP for the euro area calculated from January 1992. It is
assumed that the monetary authorities are aiming at a target close to 2% and that the bounds of the
target range were set at one point either side of the target in January 1992.
As the chart below shows, the mean inflation rate does not fall within the confidence interval until the
very end of the nineteen-nineties and it then stabilises at a level close to 2.5%. However, the
convergence process undoubtedly affects the period under review and the price dynamics cannot be
considered to be illustrative of the single monetary policy. Furthermore, euro area inflation was
correlated over this period, as the estimates presented in Table 2 show.29
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With inflation rate autocorrelation, the standard deviation of the mean inflation rate calculated over n
years becomes (see Crawford, 2001):
n
n 1 2 1 ... 1 - + + + +
=
r r r s
s p where ri measures the correlation between the current inflation
rate, derived from the year-on-year change in prices, and the year-on-year inflation rate with a lag of i
years.
When this autocorrelation of euro-area inflation rates is taken into account, we can represent the
confidence interval and the year-on-year changes in prices calculated from January 1998 forward,
assuming that the inflation target is “close to but less than 2%”. This target is set at 1.8% by
convention.
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This time, the mean inflation rate always falls within the confidence interval and gradually converges
towards a level slightly below 2%. This level, which corresponds to the steady-state inflation rate, is
equal to 1.94%, as was estimated earlier.
These characteristics mean that even a temporary shock to the level of euro area inflation will have a
lasting influence on price dynamics. For example, if we assume that equation (10’) gives the price
dynamics, then a shock equal to one standard deviation to the level of inflation will not be eliminated
until seven years later, as shown in Chart 16 below.
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0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
years
3.1.2. Long-term inflation expectations
When the French government launched inflation-linked Treasury bonds, which were first linked to
French inflation (OATi) and then to euro area inflation (OATie), it became possible to derive a proxy
measure of economic agents’ mean long-term inflation expectations by calculating the break-even
inflation rates, meaning the difference between nominal yields and inflation-linked yields at the same
maturity. Chart 17 below shows average inflation 10 years ahead. Even though a number of biases
influence this measure, and more particularly biases linked to liquidity premiums, long-term inflation
expectations seem to have been contained both with regard to French inflation and to euro-area
inflation. Both fall within the range from 1.5% to 2% and only rarely exceed the 2% ceiling set by the
Central European Bank.31
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02-99 08-99 02-00 08-00 02-01 08-01 02-02 08-02 02-03
OATi OATieuro
Source: Banque de France
Long-term forward interest rates on government bonds provide another measure of changes in
medium- to long-term inflation expectations. More specifically, they provide better information than
long-term interest rates do, since changes in the latter could be influenced by variations in short-term
interest rates that are not related to inflation expectations (Kohn, 2003). The five-year forward rate
starting five years ahead (denoted i5,5) is used here.26 Changes in this rate between 1991 and the present
are shown in Chart 18. Long-term forward rates have fallen by about three percentage points over the
period as a whole. A similar pattern can be observed to varying degrees in all countries (see the chart
from Kohn, 2003). Two episodes of significant rises marked the overall fall in long-term forward
rates, which spiked by about two percentage points in 1994 and again in 1999. Once again, this pattern
was not specific to the euro area; forward rates rose to varying degrees in all industrialised countries in
1994 and in 1999. More specifically, the rise observed in 1999 does not seem to be attributable to
concern about the introduction of the single monetary policy. In any event, the stability of i5,5 has been
remarkable. It has remained within a range of 5% to 6% since 1999.
Chart 18
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0,2)-1. Source: Bloomberg, calculations by the authors.32
3.2. Role of money in anchoring long-term expectations
How can we explain the stability of the inflation rate and inflation expectations observed in the
medium to long term in the euro area? Has the announcement of a reference value for monetary
growth contributed to this stability? Many analysts have said that the answer to this last question is no
on the basis of the lessons drawn from the New Keynesian theoretical model that has been used up
until now. But, even if money plays no role in the determination of the short-term inflation rate, it does
play a role in the medium to long term. The equilibrium inflation rate is therefore determined by
achieving monetary equilibrium and it depends on the growth rate of the money supply. Before
looking at this point in greater detail, it would be helpful to review the analysis of money demand
behaviour.
3.2.1. Review of money demand
The money demand function used up until the present assumes that securities maturing during the
period are the only category of assets that can be substituted for money. This assumption is much too
restrictive and, in fact, a great many real and financial assets, including bonds, equities and physical
capital, can be substituted for money (Friedman, 1956; Nelson 2002). In order to take this into
account, we can assume that the demand for money depends on both the short-term rate and the long-
term rate, which means replacing equation (7) with the following specification called the “Friedman-
Meltzer type” specification (Nelson, 2002):
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where i
l is the long-term rate; k y is income elasticity; k i denotes the semi-elasticity to the spread
between the long-term rate and the short-term rate. Equation (7) can be rewritten using the Fisher
equation, which states that:
in the long term:
in the short term: ( )
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where r
l is the real long-term interest rate; r is the real short-term interest rate; Et(pt
l) is the expected
long-term inflation rate (i.e. between date t and date t+l).
This is the specification that is usually used for econometric research on the broad M3 aggregate in the
euro area (see Avouyi-Dovi et al., 2003, Coenen and Vega, 1999; Gerlach and Svensson, 1999). This
research highlights a specific characteristic of the euro area, where money demand seems to be much
more stable than it is in comparable economies (United States, United Kingdom and Japan). The
estimated values for ky are generally between 1.1 and 1.5, which indicates a steadily diminishing trend
in the velocity of circulation.27The estimated values for ki are around – 0.8 (Coenen and Vega, 1999).
27 Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2003) is an exception. In their estimate, the authors impose the constraint ky =1.33
3.2.2. Pointlessness of a monetary growth target
There is a very widely held view that the shift from the short to medium term to the medium to long
term does not change the analysis of the determination of the equilibrium inflation rate. This means
that announcing a monetary growth target would not be helpful for ensuring long-term price stability.
This result is demonstrated by analysing the economy’s steady state using equations (1) through (6)
and equation (7’). It is assumed that the environment includes a central bank that provides anchoring
of short-term expectations, that this central bank enjoys strong credibility and that financial markets
are efficient. In the economy’s steady state, the expected value of real balances is equal to:




t i t y t t E E r r E y E p m E p p k k
where E [.] corresponds to the mean value calculated over the long term. To simplify, let us assume
that: 1) the interest rate is constant; 2) short-term expectations are anchored on the central bank’s
inflation target, in which case, (12) could be written as:
[] [ ] [ ] [ ] * 2) 1 ( p p k k - - = -
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If we assume that the central bank is credible and the markets are efficient, this gives:
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In this equation, monetary growth is the only endogenous variable, if we assume that the long-term
growth rate of the economy is constant (gy):
[] * . (15) p k + = D y y t g m E
The real GDP growth rate and the inflation target determine the long-term money-supply growth rate.
From this point of view, the shift from the short to the medium term to the medium to long term does
not make any difference: monitoring monetary growth is equally pointless in both cases. It is even
more pointless to announce the monetary growth rate calculated with (15) as a reference value to guide
private sector agents in forming their expectations. “The robustness of the long-run link between
money growth and inflation and the consensus around it do not justify assigning a monetary aggregate
a special status in the monetary policy strategy of a central bank, not even one that has price stability
as a primary goal. The reason is simple: equation (15) is a long-run equilibrium relationship, which
will hold independently of the monetary regime in place. In other words, achieving the desired
inflation objective does not require paying special attention to the evolution of monetary aggregates”
(Gali, 2003). Or, to put it another way: under the assumptions made, the quantity of money is
endogenous and inflation targeting is an institutional device that can be used to ensure the integrity of
the unit of account over time (Aglietta, 2002).
3.2.3. Need to announce a monetary growth target
The critique of the New Keynesian approach to the determination of the equilibrium inflation rate
stresses the importance of money for ensuring long-term monetary stability (McCallum, 2001; Nelson,
2002).34
This critique is based on the following idea: contrary to the assumption made in the previous
demonstration, the central bank’s influence over the nominal interest rate does not operate in the same
way in the short term as it does in the long term. In the short term, the central bank can influence the
nominal interest rate (it=rt+Etpt+1) by increasing the quantity of money. This increases real balances
and lowers the real interest rate r and, consequently, the nominal interest rate i though a liquidity
effect. The liquidityeffect does not come into play in the long term. The central bank cannot influence
the real interest rate. Thus, its only means of action with regard to the nominal rate is to influence
inflation expectations. In the steady state:
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 16 (
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The central bank’s action has to be carried out through E(pt
l). What are the determinants of the
expected inflation rate in the steady state? The Phillips Curve equation and the IS equation are of no
help here.28 On the other hand, the money market equilibrium equation provides the relationship
between the mean value of the inflation rate and the mean value of the money supply growth rate,
which is influenced by the central bank:
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Contrary to the assumption made under the New Keynesian analysis, the mean value of the long-term
inflation rate determines the mean value of the expected short-term inflation rate.
) ( ) ( (18) 1
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And, instead of (15), we get:
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In order to anchor long-term expectations at the desired level, the central bank has to announce a
money supply growth target derived using equation (15’). To ensure the overall consistency of
monetary strategy, meaning consistency between expectations in the short to medium term, discussed
in the second section, and the anchoring of medium- to long-term expectations, the following must
hold:
[] * . * * (19) p k + = = D y y M t g g m E
If all of the conditions set out above hold, then long-term price-level uncertainty will be reduced and it
will be stationary around a trend. This means that monetary stability will be ensured both in the short
term and in the long term. The value chosen for gM* in the euro area is 4.5%. This is derived by
multiplying the estimated value of ky, which is 1.3 on average, by the medium-term trend of GDP
growth (2 % < gy < 2.5 %) and by adding up the parameter consistent with the definition of price
stability (less than 2% increase in the HICP) (ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2001 . It is important to
note that the reference value announced is relative to the growth of nominal balances, but to achieve
stationarity of the (log) general price level around a trend, the demand for real balances (m-p in
equation 17) needs to be stable.
3.3. Attempt to evaluate long-term monetary stability in the euro area
We can evaluate the ECB’s monetary strategy aimed at ensuring long-term monetary stability by
examining either the results, measuring the quality of the anchoring of long-term expectations, or by
28 As long as in equation (2), b=1 and f=0.35
examining the method used, measuring the contribution of money to the anchoring of expectations. It
is obviously difficult to make such an evaluation at this time, particularly with regard to the second
point, since the ECB has been operating for only four and a half years.
3.3.1. Quality of the anchoring of long-term expectations
A central bank’s ability to anchor inflation expectations can be measured by the extent to which long-
term inflation expectations respond to changes in economic agents’ very-short-term inflation
expectations (Kohn, 2003).
A weak response would indicate that, despite the substantial revisions of short-term expectations that
can be formed in the wake of the various shocks affecting price dynamics, for example, the central
bank still maintains effective control over prices in the medium to long term and thus manages to
anchor long-term expectations solidly at a level that is compatible with its ultimate target.
This type of measurement can be derived from the data provided by the Consensus Forecasts, by
looking at the way revisions of inflation expectations for the current year are passed onto expectations
five to ten years ahead.
Table 5
Changes in long-term expectations in the event of a shock
to short-term expectations





1990 – 2003 42 10 0.24
1999 – 2003 32 10 0.31
United Kingdom
1990 – 2003 53 17 0.32
1999 – 2003 22 10 0.45
Canada
1990 – 2003 64 18 0.28
1999 – 2003 40 12 0.30
Euro area
1999 – 2003 28 10 0.35
Source: Consensus Economics – Banque de France Calculations. The weighted mean of inflation expectations in Germany, France, Italy and
the Netherlands from 1999 to 2002 is a proxy for expected inflation in the euro area.
As the table above shows, an average of only one third of the revisions of short-term expectations are
passed on to the long-term inflation expectations. In this respect, the ECB’s ability to anchor inflation
expectations seems to be comparable to that of other leading central banks.
It is helpful to compare the five-year forward rate starting five years ahead, shown below, to monetary
policy changes reflected in the short-term rate (Chart 19). At the end of 2000, both rates were
practically equal. Today, the short-term rate is down by two percentage points, whereas the five-year
forward rate starting five years ahead is still virtually unchanged from its initial value. This shows that
the ECB was able to loosen monetary conditions without triggering any notable change in long-term
inflation expectations.29
29 Incidentally, the value of i5,5 is higher than it was in early 1999, which means that it shows no threat of a deflationary spiral in
the mediumterm.36
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3.3.2. Contribution of money to anchoring long-term expectations
Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1990) propose an indicator of long-term price-level uncertainty that is
constructed using a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition. When P
T
t denotes the trend value of the price













where n is a large constant. This variable has an asymptotic variance that can be estimated by (4n / 3T)
Vn(P
T).
It is a delicate matter to use such an approach in the euro area, primarily because of the small size of
the samples available. The trend value derived using the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition30 does not
capture changes in the price level very well (see Chart 20 below). However, if we limit the estimates
to the period in which the ECB has been operating, the trend derived from the Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition is very close to a linear trend. This result is fragile, but it tends to corroborate the
reduction in price-level uncertainty since 1999 that has already been shown. The Bordo, Choudhri and
Schwartz indicator, which measures variance in forecasts of the trend component of the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition, diminishes sharply from 6.4´10
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A second way of measuring the contribution that money makes to anchoring long-term inflation
expectations is to run stationarity tests on the level of the HICP and the level of real balances, which
are measured here as the ratio of M3 to the HICP, in order to assess to what extent these two series can
be considered to be stable around a deterministic trend. In such a case, prices and real balances will
only deviate from their long-term trend temporarily in the event of exogenous shocks. This statistical
property implies the absence of uncertainty about the long-term price-level or the level of real
balances. On the other hand, if the series are stationary in difference (I(1)), then an exogenous shock to
the price level will be persistent and there will always be uncertainty about the medium- to long-term
price level. These tests produced the following results in the euro area:
30 This decomposition is derived from an ARIMA(1,1,1) model of the HICP estimated for the period from 1992q1-2003q3.38
Table 6
Stationarity tests on the HICP level and real balances
Variable Test used 1992q1 – 2003q3 1999q1 – 2003q3













* significant at the 10% threshold, ** significant at the 1% threshold
These results covering the whole period from 1992 to 2003 reject the hypothesis of stationarity of the
price level and real balances around a deterministic trend. Therefore, there is a high degree of long-
term price-level uncertainty in the euro area. Furthermore, the non-stationarity of real balances around
a long-term trend seems to indicate that a real balance growth target, like the one considered by Milton
Friedman (1960), would not eliminate long-term price-level uncertainty. This conclusion seems to be
in contradiction with the work done by the ECB and others on the stability of money demand in the
euro area. However, it should be noted that the indicators used in this study are not the same as the
ones that the ECB used in its own research, which underpins the determination of the reference value
for money growth.
Furthermore, these tests were run for the whole period and they are bound to be biased by the
convergence process, which may have produced atypical price dynamics in the euro area. In addition
the dynamics cannot be interpreted as resulting from the implementation of the single monetary
policy, even though domestic monetary policies in Europe were very closely coordinated. Thus, it
would be helpful to run the tests again over the period after the ECB started its operations, even
though this would mean a big reduction in the sample size and a possible bias in the results owing to
the weakness of some of the tests (particularly the ADF test). The second column in Table 6 somewhat
modifies the results obtained for the period as a whole. More specifically, the tests no longer reject the
hypothesis of price stationarity around a deterministic trend. This could be interpreted as a great
success for the ECB, meaning that it has managed to reduce or even eliminate uncertainty about the
price level. On the other hand, the tests still point to the conclusion that real balances are stationary in
difference. Consequently, the information currently available does not enable us to measure the exact
contribution that the money growth target makes to reducing long-term price-level uncertainty.
The empirical link between inflation and money growth can also be estimated more directly. Some
recent work, such as that by De Grauwe and Polan (2001), questions the link and rejects the principle
first stated by Milton Friedman that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. On
the basis of the estimation of such a link in the euro area, it appears that the relationship between
inflation and money growth is weak and insignificant, as shown in Table 7 below. More specifically,
the money growth coefficient is very different from unity and not significantly different from zero.
Table 7
Dependent variable: pt
Method: OLS – Newy-West HAC – Period 1992q1 to 2003q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 0.016109 0.004432 3.634675 0.0004
M3t 0.103449 0.070822 1.460704 0.1467
R-squared 0.061602 Mean dependent var 0.021838
Adjusted R-squared 0.053847 S.D. dependent var 0.007058
S.E. of regression 0.006866 Akaike info criterion -7.108445
Sum squared resid 0.005704 Schwarz criterion -7.062719
Log likelihood 439.1694 F-statistic 7.943222
Durbin-Watson stat 0.082471 Prob(F-statistic) 0.00564039
As E. Nelson (2002) pointed out, such a result cannot undermine the relevance of the relationship
between money growth and prices. In fact, relationship is primarily a long-term one. And the
information content of money vis-à-vis inflation is only truly relevant starting two or more years
ahead. If, instead of looking at current money growth, we examine annual M3 growth lagged by two,
three and four years, we end up with radically different results:
Table 8
Dependent variable: pt
Method: OLS – Newy-West HAC – period 1997q1 to 2003q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.020273 0.009581 -2.115939 0.0379
M3t-24 0.296537 0.082579 3.590947 0.0006
M3t-36 0.308758 0.085243 3.622110 0.0005
M3t-48 0.206557 0.074235 2.782467 0.0069
R-squared 0.370293 Mean dependent var 0.018034
Adjusted R-squared 0.343685 S.D. dependent var 0.005619
S.E. of regression 0.004552 Akaike info criterion -7.894685
Sum squared resid 0.001471 Schwarz criterion -7.771086
Log likelihood 300.0507 F-statistic 13.91693
Durbin-Watson stat 0.302000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
In the case of the euro area, the monetary growth coefficients are not only statistically different from
zero, their cumulative sum is equal to 0.81 and no longer very far from unity in this case, in keeping
with Friedman’s principle. This result is also identical to the one that Nelson (2002) obtained for the
United States.
Conclusion
The price-stability-oriented monetary policy strategy adopted by the European Central Bank can be
qualified as a mixed or hybrid strategy: it aims to anchor medium-term inflation expectations, by
ensuring that they stay within a narrow range between 1.7% and 1.9%, while also attempting to restrict
long-term price-level uncertainty, by announcing a reference value for the growth of the M3 monetary
aggregate. Such a strategy is bound to be more difficult to explain to the public than a pure inflation-
targeting strategy or a pure money-growth targeting strategy would be. Analysts who focus on the
short to medium term cannot see the point of a money growth target, as they do not consider that such
a target provides any useful information. Analysts who focus solely on long-term price stability cannot
understand the importance attributed to short-term developments. For them, such developments are
just so much noise that is difficult to interpret and not worth bothering about. In reality, these two
aspects of monetary policy strategy are actually complementary. Theoretical and empirical analyses
show that they form a coherent whole.
The New Keynesian framework is appropriate for analysing short- to medium-term monetary policy
strategy. A policy to anchor inflation expectations is an effective instrument for ensuring monetary
stability. Furthermore, money can provide helpful information about the future direction of economic
activity and, to a lesser extent, about price developments. On the other hand, New Keynesian analysis
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. Money
plays a decisive role in the long term and the announcement of a reference value for money supply
growth has a sound theoretical basis. The construction of theoretical models to achieve coherence
between New Keynesian analysis in the short to medium term and monetary analysis in the long term
has long been a major objective for economic theory. Substantial progress has been made in this
direction. We now have models where inflation expectations are Keynesian in the short to medium
term, meaning that they are formed on the basis of a Phillips curve, and monetarist in the medium to
long term, meaning that they are derived from monetary factors. These models justify the choice of a40
hybrid or a “mixed” monetary policy strategy, where the central bank focuses on both the real
determinants and the monetary factors influencing the price level to ensure full anchoring of both
short-term and long-term expectations. Yet, it must be acknowledged that the theoretical analysis of
hybrid strategies is not as advanced as that of pure strategies. There is agreement about the
effectiveness of a short-term inflation target based on New Keynesian criteria, but what would be the
best supplementary device to ensure long-term price-level stability? One of the major objectives for
research in coming years should be to compare the effectiveness of the various possible solutions, such
as announcing a reference value for money growth, an escape clause or an error-correction
mechanism.
Since the single monetary policy has been applied in the euro area, the short-term inflation dynamics
has been greatly disrupted by a series of temporary price shocks, but these shocks have not affected
the anchor for inflation expectations, which have remained remarkably stable in a range between 1.5%
and 2%. A number of points stand out with regard to the medium and long term: 1) The steady-state
average annual inflation rate is about 1.9%, which is “close to, but less than 2%”, but reversion to the
steady state after a temporary inflation shock is still quite slow, because of the strong inertia of
inflation. 2) The various measurements of long-term inflation expectations are consistent and stable,
ranging from 1.5% to 2%. Empirical analysis produces a fairly reassuring picture of the medium- to
long-term effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy: 1) A shock that affects short-term
inflation expectations usually does not have a knock-on effect on longer-term inflation expectations. 2)
The stability of long-term expectations means that the ECB does not have to act particularly
aggressively. 3) Since 1999, analysis has not rejected the hypothesis of price stationarity around a
deterministic trend, which is a sign of long-term stability in the inflation rate and an absence of price-
level uncertainty. But this is only a preliminary analysis after only five years of ECB operations. A
more precise assessment of the long-term effectiveness of the ECB’s action will take longer.
In terms of monetary policy strategy, the clarification provided at the end of the ECB Governing
Council meeting on 8 May 2003 was useful in two respects in light of the conclusions of this report.
– The distinction drawn between “economic analysis”, which refers to the New Keynesian analytical
framework, and “monetary analysis” is a relevant one, because it makes it possible to anchor
short-, medium- and long-term inflation expectations simultaneously.
– It also solves a problem in communicating and even implementing the single monetary policy
strategy. This strategy was based on a presentation of the two “pillars” as alternative explanations
for inflation, which could end up giving money a role in stabilising short-term expectations that it
would be unable to play. In fact, the two approaches are complements to each other rather than
alternatives. Money plays a decisive role in anchoring long-term inflationary expectations, while
the New Keynesian framework is adequate for analysing short-term expectations.
– Finally, the anchoring of inflation expectations stemming from the announcement of the reference
value and from the European Central Bank’s credibility ensures that there is no long-term price-
level uncertainty. This means that monetary policy does not necessarily have to compensate for a
deviation from the inflation path in the short term, since the reversion to the equilibrium path
should be achieved via the channel of expectations.41
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